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1.  For a more de- 
tailed account of the 
short-term implica- 
tions of these projec- 
tions, see John B. 
Carlson (1985). 
2.  Theframework 
can in no way deter- 
mine consistency 
among assumptions; 
this depends on the 
model ofthe  econ- 
omy used. 
3.  In practice, year- 
to-year changes in 
the federal debt do 
not precisely equal 
the corresponding 
annual federal bud- 
get deficits. The 
inequality results 
because Congress 
borrows to finance 
net spending on cer- 
tain off-budget pro- 
grams, and because 
the Treasury finances 
a small portion of 
the deficit through 
changes in various 
assets such as its cash 
balances. Here we 
use the term deficit 
to refer to both on- 
budget and off-budget 
items; we ignore the 
small changes in 
Treasury assets. 
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Recently, interest payments on the national 
debt have been growing faster than the econ- 
omy (figure 1). Since 1977,  there has been an 
11.5 percent average annual increase in inter- 
est payments. If  this difference between growth 
rates were to continue unchanged until the 
year 2013, the federal government would be 
forced to borrow or tax the equivalent of  the 
entire gross national product simply to service 
its existing debt. 
This alarming possibility may not seem 
likely, because Congress and the administra- 
tion are seeking deficit reductions that would 
slow future growth of  the national debt and 
debt service. Unfortunately, even a large defi- 
cit reduction might not be sufficient to prevent 
continued cancerous growth of  interest pay- 
ments if  the interest rate cost of  existing debt 
were to continuously exceed the growth rate 
of  the economy. However, independent projec- 
tions by both the Office of  Management and 
Budget and the Congressional Budget Office 
have suggested that net interest payments are 
not likely to grow faster than the economy 
for very long! 
Even putting aside the alarming possibil- 
ity of  an economic disaster 30 years from now, 
the fact still remains that the national debt 
and debt service costs have been growing very 
rapidly. In all but one of  the past 10 years, 
the federal government has had to borrow not 
only the entire amount needed to pay the in- 
terest on the national debt, but also additional 
funds for non-interest expenditures. Moreover, 
this situation would continue for as far as 
the eye can see under all but the most sanguine 
projections discussed in this article. 
This is not the first time that federal defi- 
cits have been large or that debt service needs 
have loomed large in federal budgets. This 
Economic Review offers two perspectives on the 
current federal debt situation. One is a histo- 
rical view of  the past 40 years, during which 
federal debt initially declined slightly from its 
wartime peak, and then began to accelerate. 
The other perspective is of  the future, including 
several scenarios of  what the next 40 years 
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could be like. The  framework for looking at 
both the past and the future is provided by 
investigating the relative values of  economic 
growth, interest rates, tax rates, and seign- 
iorage. The  analysis shows that the factors 
favorable to a net reduction in debt relative to 
GNP during the past 40 years are not likely 
to recur in the next 40 years. Substantial 
expenditure and/or tax  changes are the only 
certain methods for preventing unprecedented 
peacetime levels of  the national debt in the 
future. 
I. Debt Dynamics 
The  behavior of debt over time is complex; 
it involves the interaction of  deficits, interest 
rates, and economic activity. Nevertheless, 
the government budget constraint provides 
a straightforward accounting basis for exam- 
ining dynamic consequences of  alternative 
assumptions as  well as their consistency with 
certain expected long-run characteristics of  the 
econ~my.~  The  logic of accounting requires 
that the change in total outstanding govern- 
A Primer on Government Debt 
I  References to "the public debt" mask many details that,  long sweep of  years, debt  might  be  issued  in  lean 
upon closer inspection, are qualitatively important but  years, then retired in fat years to serve a useful public 
quantitatively small. The lion's share of  $1.577 trillion  purpose. Cyclical variations in  national income and 
dollars of  the federal debt outstanding at the close of  output, originating from sources outside the federal 
fiscal year 1984 has been issued by the Treasury to fi-  budget, give  rise to corresponding variation  in  tax 
nance budget deficits and, with the exception of  savings  receipts  and  inversely  corresponding  variations  in 
bonds, is in marketable form held by the general public.  expenditure, and thereby to federal deficits and debt 
The debt would be 21 percent greater if  one were to  outstanding. The result is a federal budget that acts 
include $331 billion  of  outstanding interest-bearing  as an automatic stabilizer as compared with one in 
securities issued by non-government institutions (pri-  which receipts were required to balance expenditures 
vately owned, not federally guaranteed, but with a spe-  at all times. If  the federal government is to act as an 
cia1 relationship to the government, for example, federal  automatic stabilizer, then some government debt may 
intermediate credit banks). Seventy-three percent of  be a cyclical nece~sity.~ 
public and agency debt outstanding in 1984 was held  Federal debt supplies a perfectly safe interest-bearing 
by the public, U. S. government accounts held another  asset for private wealth owners' portfoliosPAn increase 
17 percent ($264 billion),  and the Federal Reserve held  in outstanding federal debt will make a difference to 
the remaining 10 percent. Of  the $1.577 trillion of  fed-  the functioning of  the economy, because portfolio man- 
era1 debt, only about 11 percent was held by  foreign-  agers must be induced to substitute less risky federal 
ers, and 80 percent of  that was in the portfolios  of  for-  debt for more risky private assets that directly or indi- 
eign central banks and other official institutions. The  rectly finance real capital. In this way, rapid growth of 
inference that can be drawn from these calculations is  government debt would retard investment in new pro- 
that about 62 percent, or $1.0 trillion, of  federal debt is  ductivity-enhancing capital, thus slowing the growth 
directly held by domestic private owners, over 90 per-  rate of  real income per capita. 
cent of  which is in the form of  marketable interest-  Finally, there is the view that "we owe it to our- 
bearing instruments and 10 percent in nonmarketable  selves." Government can finance its operations either 
U. S. savings bonds.  through taxes or through debts. The argument is that, 
Granted, a sizable federal debt exists, and most of  it  given a level of  government expenditures, the econ- 
is willingly bought in the market and held by domestic  omy is essentially unaffected by  the choice between 
private owners. What difference does it make whether  these two methods of  finance, because issuing debt 
the debt becomes larger or smaller, either absolutely  rather than taxing to finance government expenditures 
or relative to the income and wealth of  U.S. citizens?  implies that citizens would expect to pay future taxes 
Three different approaches to thinking about this ques-  necessary to service the new debt. Recognizing those 
tion can be identified, emphasizing the role of  federal  increased future tax obligations, citizens would be ex- 
debt in cyclical stabilization of  the economy, in meet-  pected to increase their saving as taxes are reduced. 
ing the portfolio needs of  wealth owners, and as an 
alternative to taxation.  a  The  same function could be served by the Treasury accumulating  Federal debt can be a cyclical necessity. Even if the  holdings of  private assets in fat years and reducing them in lean years. 
Treasury had no debt outstanding on average over a  b. "Perfectly safe:'  of course, within a non-revolutionary environment. 
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ment debt, D, equal the budget deficit, which is 
the difference between federal government 
expenditures, E, and total government reve- 
nues, R.3 This is expressed as: 
Public discussion about growth of  the 
national debt typically focuses on the budget 
deficit. To better appreciate the dynamic ele- 
ments of  deficits and debt, it is useful to break 
the budget deficit into two components. One 
is the primary deficit (or surplus), defined 
as the difference between non-interest outlays 
and total revenues. The other component is 
interest outlays net of  recoupments from fed- 
eral taxes and the Federal Reserve. Combining 
these two components, we have: 
where X is the primary deficit, i is the average 
interest rate on Treasury debt, m is the aver- 
age marginal tax rate, and b is the proportion 
of  debt held by the Federal Reserve? 
This dichotomy between the primary defi- 
cit and interest payments is useful because it 
Fig. 1  Interest Payments 
Percent of  GNP 
1946  1956  1966  1976 
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office. 
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highlights the importance of  interest payments 
in determining debt momentum, that is, the 
tendency of  the debt to grow on its own. Debt 
momentum is to a large extent predetermined 
by the level of  current debt and by the mar- 
ket rates of  interest at the various times that 
existing debt issues were sold. Federal reve- 
nues recouped from interest payments on the 
debt reduce the effective interest cost and 
thereby retard debt's momentum. These rev- 
enues include taxes on private holders' interest 
income from federal debt and the portion of 
interest income on Federal Reserve holdings of 
Treasury debt (seigniorage) that is returned 
to the U.S. Treasury? While tax rates and Sys- 
tem holdings of  Treasury debt can be altered 
to influence debt momentum, practical con- 
straints limit the extent to which policymak- 
ers can change them. For example, non-infla- 
tionary monetary policy clearly implies some 
upper limit on Federal Reserve accumulation of 
Treasury debt. Tax rates may be easier to 
change, but any politically acceptable policy 
probably could not greatly alter the average 
marginal tax rate. Nevertheless, over long 
periods, these factors can change. 
The primary deficit (or surplus), of  course, 
also plays a rile in debt dynamics by reinforc- 
ing or offsetting debt momentum. The  size 
of  the primary deficit is directly altered by 
changes in the budget, such as the policy ini- 
tiatives embodied in the recent Congressional 
Budget Resolution for 1986. The primary defi- 
cit also includes the cyclical elements of  the 
budget deficit that arise from the  effects of  the 
business cycle on revenues and income main- 
tenance programs. Thus, the primary deficit 
tends to reinforce debt momentum during eco- 
nomic slowdowns and to offset momentum 
during economic recoveries.6 
The-magnitude of  debt momentum by itself 
is not very instructive. What is relevant is 
its  size relative to growth of  the  economy. Eco- 
nomic growth eases the burden of  servicing 
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debt. Additional national income and output 
can add to revenues and can reduce spending on 
social programs. The  combination-sometimes 
called a fiscal dividend-can be used to make 
interest payments and, if  sufficiently large, 
to pay down outstanding debt. In this sense, the 
burden of  debt in the economy diminishes if 
its growth lags the growth of  nominal national 
income. Thus, analyses concerned with eco- 
nomic implications of  debt dynamics typically 
concentrate on the ratio of  debt to income, 
measured by GNl? 
Much attention has been given to the poten- 
tial for runaway debt, that is, the possibility 
that the debt-to-GNP ratio will grow without 
limit. Sufficient conditions for runaway debt 
are that: 1) there be a primary deficit, and 2) the 
interest rate on Treasury debt net of  taxes 
and adjusted for Federal Reserve holdings 
be greater than the trend growth rate of  nom- 
inal GNP7  Realistically, this situation could 
not persist, because it would ultimately re- 
quire that more than all of the income gener- 
ated in the economy be used to purchase annual 
additions to the federal debt. The  structure 
of  runaway debt conditions therefore suggests 
that the budget and/or economic assumptions 
are untenable-that somehow something 
must "give." 
Even if  the trend growth rate of  nominal 
GNP were greater than the net interest rate, 
debt could still grow for a time relative to GNl? 
This situation arises when the primary defi- 
cit adds to the debt faster than the excess of  the 
1  Federal Debt Dynamics 
1  debt are derived  Assuming nominal GNP grows at trend rate g, the 
ent budget constraint, which requires  time path of  debt-to-GNP (d) is given by: 
in total outstanding Treasury debt 
a1 Reserve holdings) be equal to the  dt = x + [(I  + ia)/(l  + g)d,-J 
since 
D, - 4-1  =  E, - R,,  Dt-1 = dt-l[~t/(l  + dl. 
e D is outstanding interest-bearing Treasury debt,  When the debt-to-GNP ratio is stable: 
overnment expenditures, and R is government 
a For simplicity, we abstract from government  dt = dt-l = d*. 
and assume that the average marginal tax  Hence: 
the same for all types of  income and constant  d*[l - (1 + ia)/(l + g)] = x, 
nditures can be divided into non-interest out- 
and interest payments net of  taxes and adjusted 
ia  = i(1 - m)(l - b)Dt-l, 
ere i is the nominal interest rate on Treasury secu- 
es, and b is the proportion of  Treasury debt held by 
Federal Reserve. This allows separation of  the bud- 
deficit into two components-the primary deficit: 
xt  = (E; - Rt), 
interest payments adjusted for taxes and seignior- 
b Thus we have: 
Dt - Dt-1 = Xt + iaDt-l. 
t time t, then, the level of  federal debt equals: 
Dt = xY; + (1 + ia)  Dt-l, 
where x = X/Y and is assumed fixed by fiscal policy. 
also when i and g are small 
(1 + ia)/(l + g) = 1  + ia  - g, 
and 
d* = x/(g - ia). 
The level of  d, changes when do f  d* At any subse- 
quent time t: 
dt = d*  + (do-d*)(l + ia -g)'. 
It can be seen from this last equation, that if  ia >  g, the 
debt-to-output ratio grows without bound. Also, it is 
interesting to note debt grows relative to income when: 
d*>doandia<g. 
a. For alternative  derivations  of these properties, see Congress of  the 
United States, Congressional Budget Office (February  1985), Tobin 
(1982),  and Wallich and Cohen (1985). 
b.  Because interest payments are net of  tax recoupments and seign- 
iorage, government revenues here are exclusively tax receipts on nom- 
inal income. 
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economic growth rate over the net interest 
rate subtracts. Nonetheless, this situation 
would not continue forever, because the alge- 
braic value of  the debt-to-GNP ratio would 
eventually reach a steady-state level, even if 
a primary deficit were allowed to persist at 
something like its current size. That steady- 
state level can be shown to be approximated by 
the ratio of  the primary deficit (relative to 
GNP) to the economic growth rate/net inter- 
est-rate differential (see box 1). There is no 
a priori basis, however, for thinking that the 
portfolio of  the private sector could accom- 
modate every possible algebraic value of  the 
steady-state debt-to-income ratio and still be 
consistent with general equilibrium in the econ- 
omy. Of  course, if  the primary deficit were 
reduced sufficiently, then the debt-to-GNP ratio 
would fall, until a low algebraic value of  the 
Box 2  Debt Buildup in World War I1 
Large deficits in the United States typically have been 
limited to wartime. The deficits during World War  I1 
offer the most extreme example: they averaged 25 per- 
cent of  GNF! The conditions for financing those defi- 
cits were unique to wartime. Economic resources were 
shifted from producing consumer goods to military uses. 
To implement this reallocation, the federal government 
instituted controls, including price controls and food and 
gasoline rationing. Individuals accepted these controls 
as requirements of  patriotism, if not for their own long- 
term interest. Although credit controls were imposed 
to reduce demand for housing, automobiles, and appli- 
ances, these items simply were not available, because 
steel, wood, and labor were diverted to the war effort. 
Individuals not in military service during the war typ- 
ically worked a substantial amount of  overtime. While 
their incomes were high, there was little to spend it on. 
Savings rates averaged 25 percent from 1942 to 1945, 
compared with a peacetime average of  6 percent. Thus, 
while the federal debt increased five-fold during the war, 
the government found many willing to purchase debt 
at very low rates of  interest. To help keep rates low, the 
Federal Reserve was prepared to buy government secu- 
rities not purchased by individuals. But the proportion 
of  debt monetized by the Federal Reserve did not increase 
sharply, because private demand was sufficient. To  pro- 
mote private purchases of  U.S. savings bonds, the gov- 
ernment mounted an extensive advertising campaign 
that appealed to the people's patriotism. 
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steady-state ratio were reached-again, if  that 
were consistent with general equilibrium. 
11.  Debt Dynamics: 
1946 to Present 
During World War 11, enormous primary defi- 
cits caused a five-fold increase in the level 
of  federal debt (see box 2). Immediately after 
the war, the large primary deficits ceased, 
and the level of  debt began an  extended decline 
relative to GNP. Not until 1974 did the com- 
bined influence of  primary deficits and inter- 
est rates begin to generate another sustained 
increase in the federal debt relative to GNF! 
Figure 2 shows the absolute amount of 
the federal debt held in the private sector (ex- 
cluding the Federal Reserve) and that same 
amount relative to GNP, both indexed to their 
1946 levels. Although the dollar value of  debt 
trended upward slightly until 1974, the debt- 
to-GNP ratio fell over the same period. This 
decline-from a little more than one year's 
output to less than one quarter's output-per- 
sisted through the Kennedy tax cut and even 
through the Vietnam military buildup. Reversal 
of  the decline in the mid-1970s was initially 
a consequence of  enlarged primary deficits 
resulting from the severe 1973-1975 recession, 
augmented by a one-time tax rebate in 1975. 
By the peak of  the business cycle in 1979, how- 
ever, at least the primary deficit had been 
eliminated (see figure 3). 
An important characteristic of  debt dynam- 
ics during the 28-year period of  declining debt 
ratios, was the frequent occurrence of pri- 
mary surpluses that actually produced a 
small cumulative net primary surplus from 
1946 through 1974.8 While many factors could 
account for surpluses, an important factor 
was the budget's response to inflation. From 
1946 to 1974, the GNP deflator rose at an 
average annual rate of  5.5 percent, but until 
1972, few federal spending programs were 
indexed. Benefits from large entitlement pro- 
grams, such as  Social Security, did not increase 
automatically with inflation? On the other 
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Fig. 2  Federal Debt Held by Public 
Percent of  1946 level 
620 
Fig. 3  Primary  and  Total Deficita 
Percent of  GNP 
8 
a. Primary deficit assumes a marginal tax rate of  12 percent. 
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than income, as inflation placed more and 
more taxpayers in higher tax brackets. Thus, 
even a relatively low inflation rate was doubly 
favorable for restraining the primary deficit, 
because, without explicit federal action, it 
tended to increase revenues faster than non- 
interest expenditures. 
Since 1974, the budget has produced a cu- 
mulative primary deficit of  about $430 billion. 
This turnaround owes largely to the Eco- 
nomic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) of  1981, a 
tax initiative that sharply reduced the rate of 
growth of  tax revenues. Large tax cuts were 
instituted with the expectation that there 
would be subsequent spending reductions in 
nonmilitary programs as well as additional 
revenues generated by more rapid economic 
growth. Subsequent output growth was rela- 
tively strong and generated proportionately 
more revenues, but the impact of  ERTA fell 
short of  supply-sider claims that it would 
produce sufficient revenue growth to elimi- 
nate the deficit. Moreover, Congress did not 
accept all the spending cuts initially sought by 
the administration. Because an important 
feature of  ERTA was to index tax rates for 
inflation, the imbalance is likely to persist if 
substantial deficit cuts are not achieved. 
Another aspect of  postwar debt dynamics 
was the apparent failure of  interest rates to rise 
rapidly enough to anticipate the persistent, 
accelerating inflation beginning in the late 
1960s. Relative price stability of  the 1950s and 
early 1960s set a favorable tone for credit mar- 
kets before the onset of  more rapid inflation. 
Most federal debt had been auctioned at rates 
under 5 percent prior to 1966. When inflation 
began to accelerate in the late 1960s, it was 
apparently unanticipated. With a sizable por- 
tion of  debt "locked in" at lower rates, the 
interest-rate cost of  servicing debt adjusted 
only slowly to the higher rates of  inflation 
(see figure 4). 
This inertial resistance essentially could 
account for the  continued decline of  the  debt-to- 
GNP ratio after the mid-1960s. Figure 5 shows 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
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Fig. 4  Average Interest Rate 
on Debt and Inflationa 
Percent 
- - 
Change in deflator  Interest paymentsldebt 
a.  Debt is adjusted for Federal Reserve holdings. 
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office. 
Fig. 5  Actual and Hypothetical Debt 
Percent of  GNP 
pated after 1965. It presumes that the average 
real interest rate would have equaled its aver- 
age expost rate during the low inflation period 
of  1954-1963, and then adds actual inflation 
rates for periods equal to the  average maturity 
of  the debt. Multiplying interest payments on 
the debt by the ratio of  the adjusted interest 
rate to the actual rate provides an approxima- 
tion of  debt payments and the debt-to-GNP 
ratio, if  inflation had been fully anticipated. 
On this basis, debt would have stabilized rela- 
tive to GNP near its mid-1960s level, rather 
than declining further into the mid-1970s. 
Taxes are another reason that, until recently, 
interest-rate costs of  government debt were 
low relative togrowth in nominal GNP (see fig- 
ure 6). Estimates of  the average marginal tax 
rate typically fall in the range of  12 percent to 
25 percent. Even assuming the average mar- 
ginal tax rate was only 12 percent, the annual 
interest-rate cost of the debt adjusted for taxes 
heretofore has never exceeded the five-year 
average growth rate of  GNF!1°  The momen- 
tum of  debt growth was never augmented by 
interest-rate costs in excess of  the longer-term 
nominal growth rate of  the economy. 
When debt was declining relative to nominal 
GNP, seigniorage also played an increasingly 
important role in slowing the momentum of 
debt. The monetary policy that accompanied 
economic  growth with low inflation in the 1950s 
and early 1960s produced, as a byproduct, an 
increase in Federal Reserve holdings of  Treas- 
ury securities almost proportional to the in- 
crease in nominal GNI?ll With debt declining 
relative to GNP,  and Federal Reserve holdings 
rising proportionately with GNP,  private sec- 
tor holdings of  the debt necessarily declined 
relative to GNP (see figure 7). In fact, Federal 
Reserve holdings increased to almost 19 percent 
of  all outstanding federal debt in the postwar 
period. This meant that by the early 1970s, 
seigniorage was paying roughly one-fifth of  the 
interest cost of  all debt held outside the fed- 
eral government itself. 
-  ----- 
Actual debt  Hypothetical debt 
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office. 
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SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office. 
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Fig. 7  Federal Reserve Holdings 
Percent of  federal debt 
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office. 
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dampening seigniorage. Disinflationary mon- 
etary policy since 1979 has constrained money 
growth and the seigniorage it produces. As 
debt has grown abruptly relative to GNP, the 
share held by the Federal Reserve has dropped 
sharply. Moreover, the Monetary Control Act 
of  1980 reduced overall required reserves on 
deposits. This, in turn, reduced the demand 
for monetary base (and hence, Federal Reserve 
holdings of  debt) for a given level of  nominal 
GNl? Thus, the effects of  seigniorage, so impor- 
tant to debt dynamics before the 1980s, have 
withered. 
This historical perspective emphasizes 
some unique conditions that influenced debt 
dynamics in the postwar period. Of  particular 
importance were frequent primary surpluses, 
low interest rates, and (relatively) high returns 
from seigniorage. Recreating the social and 
political forces leading to those same condi- 
tions is not possible. History, therefore, offers 
a poor basis for anticipating the future fed- 
eral debt situation. But history does provide 
a kind of  benchmark. If  future debt-to-GNP 
levels are within the range of  past experience, 
at least we know that these levels once proved 
manageable. 
111. The Next 40 Years 
Long-term projections of  the national debt, 
using the framework of  primary deficits and 
net interest payments, rest on assumptions 
about the trend growth rate of  nominal GNP, 
on the size of the primary deficit relative to 
GNP, on the level of  interest rates, and on 
marginal tax rates and seigniorage. To be 
meaningful, a set of  these assumptions must 
be mutually consistent with attainable future 
states of  the economy. Lacking a generally 
accepted quantitative, long-run, macroeco- 
nomic model by which to generate a unique 
plausible set of  those assumptions, we consider 
several different sets of  assumptions to pro- 
duce various debt scenarios. These scenarios 
should not be viewed as  forecasts, but simply as 
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potential levels of  the debt-to-GNP ratio that 
can be compared to levels experienced over 
the past 40 years. Levels that fall outside the 
range of  past experience are, ips0 facto, alarm- 
ing. Moreover, the projections can be exam- 
ined in the context of  widely accepted beliefs, 
or "stylized facts:'  about other long-run 
economic relationships that are thought to 
characterize the U.S. economy. 
Table 1 contains an array of  points along 
various steady-state paths of  the debt-to-GNP 
ratio. Alternative values of  the ratio for a com- 
mon time horizon correspond to alternative 
assumptions about (1) the size of  future pri- 
mary deficits and (2) the differential between 
the rate of  economic growth and the net rate  of 
interest on Treasury debt. The steady-state 
I  values, based on the formula in box 1, extend 
in time to horizons of  five, 10, and 40 years. 
A final array, based on an infinite horizon, 
approximates eventual steady-state values 
toward which the debt-to-GNP ratio tends in 
the very long run. 
Two characteristics of  these arrays are nota- 
ble. First, the longer-run values of  the debt- 
to-GNP ratio are clearly sensitive to what 
appear to be small differences in the values 
chosen for the assumptions. Second, however, 
the time paths of  the alternative steady states 
are somewhat slow to distinguish themselves 
from one another. After five years, the debt- 
to-GNP ratio appears relatively unaffected 
by the indicated range of  differences in the 
growthhet  interest assumption; after 40 years 
After 5 Years 
.36  .38  .41  -46  .36  .40  .45 
.37  .39  .42  .44  .46  .37  .42  .47 
.40  .42  .45  .39  .44  .48  .  .5 
.43  .46  .48 
After 40 Years 
.35  .50  .65  .95 
.57  .74  .90  1.07  1.0  1.5  2.0 
.47  .66  .84  1.02  1.20 
.54  .74  .93  1.13  1.33 
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the effect is quite significant (measured as a 
percent of  either the low or high value), al- 
though nowhere near as substantial as in the 
ultimate steady state. The  same pattern is evi- 
dent when the  effect of  differences in assumed 
values of  the primary deficit is traced. In this 
case, however, even the difference between 
the indicated high and low values at the end of 
five years is quite noticeable-equivalent to 
10 percent of  GNF! 
Three paths  of  the  debt-to-GNP ratio appear 
in figure 8, corresponding to three particular 
sets of  assumptions. The  first, scenario A, 
is not drawn from sets of  values in table 1, but 
is based on our extrapolation of  Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO) estimates that assume 
the  July 1985 budget resolution is achievedJ2 
The CBO analysis only contained projections 
through 1990 and was based on two impor- 
tant additional assumptions: that the  economy 
would achieve an  average real growth rate of 
3.4 percent and that market interest rates 
would decline, in part because of  continuing 
low inflation. The projections indicate that the 
primary deficit would be eliminated by 1988, 
and, in the absence of  any rebound in the pri- 
Fig. 8  Federal Debt 
Percent of  GNP 
Federal Reserve Bank of  Cleveland 
mary deficit and of  any deviation from the eco- 
nomic assumptions, our extrapolation shows 
continuing decreases in debt and interest pay- 
ments as a percent of  GNP over the next 40 
years-a refreshing outcome indeed. 
Scenario B, also examined by the CBO, 
assumes that none of  the budget savings 
included in the July 1985 budget resolution 
is achieved. Again, the CBO projections only 
extended through 1990. Without budget cuts, 
the CBO projects that the primary deficit 
would decline from the 1984 level of  3 per- 
cent to about 1.5 percent in 1990, as the econ- 
omy would approach its assumed full-employ- 
ment growth trend. In extrapolating, we have 
taken 2 percent as the value in the long run, 
representing an average of  lower and higher 
values that might be achieved during future 
business cyclesJ3 The other CBO assumption 
was that while the level of  market interest 
rates would be slightly higher than the  growth 
rate of  nominal GNP (as has been the case for 
the past year), rates would nonetheless fall 
short of  the growth rate of  nominal GNP by 
1.5 percent, after adjusting for the marginal 
tax rate on interest income and seigniorage. If 
the primary deficit and the growthhet inter- 
est-rate relationship were to stabilize at these 
average levels, our extrapolations show that 
the federal debt would continue to increase 
relative to GNP until it eventually stabilized 
at  about one and one-third times nominal GNP 
(shaded values in table 1). This result would 
advance only gradually, however; at the end of 
40 years, the federal debt would be "only" 
90 percent of  a year's nominal GNF! 
Scenarios A and B suggest a range of  possible 
outcomes, extrapolating from medium-term 
projections that were based on commonly used 
methodology. Where in this range of  outcomes 
the future might lie depends on the extent to 
which deficit reductions are achieved and 
maintained. 
Neither of  these scenarios is entirely sat- 
isfactory. The assumptions are drawn from 
averages of  medium-term projections as prox- 
ies for long-run equilibrium values. Moreover, 
the projections themselves are derived from 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
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macroeconomic models and economic "rules 
of  thumb" heavily influenced by post-World 
War I1 experience. But the unique combination 
of  secular influences of  this period-demobili- 
zation, rising inflation, and high seigniorage- 
is not likely to be repeated. Thus, models esti- 
mated over this period could be biased and, 
as argued below, biased toward a high growth- 
ratehnterest-rate  differential and a conse- 
quent underestimate of  future debt growth. 
Scenario C is based on assumptions that 
are consistent with a smaller growth-rate/in- 
terest-rate differental. Such a hypothetical 
case might be described as  follows: Accelerat- 
ing inflation beginning in the mid-1960s appar- 
ently was to some extent unanticipated. This 
suggests that the interest rates of  this period, 
on average, were low relative to their "true" 
equilibrium values-that is, values consistent 
with non-inflationary economic growth. This 
experience is unlikely to be repeated. Inflation 
awareness has grown with the experience of 
rising inflation, as well as  with the experience 
of  declining inflation. Furthermore, since 1979, 
the Federal Reserve has maintained a policy 
of  disinflation. A major consequence has been 
that interest rates have varied more immedi- 
ately and substantially to impulses arising in 
the real sector. This, in turn, makes it less 
likely that future interest rates will be "stuck" 
below their equilibrium levels. 
The case for a smaller growth-ratehnterest- 
rate differential seems even more plausible 
when one considers the productivity experi- 
ence of  the current expansion. Even with rec- 
ord levels of  investment, productivity increases 
have been below levels for comparable stages 
of  the cycle in the postwar period. If, in fact, 
trend growth of  productivity is increasing 
around its 1970s rate of  less than 1 percent, 
and if  labor force growth were to stabilize at 
less than 1.5 percent, then trend output growth 
could be less than 2.5 percent. Moreover, as 
indicated in figure 6, nominal pretax interest 
rates recently have exceeded the growth rate 
of  nominal income. In fact, in the third quar- 
ter of  1985 nominal income grew at 6.7 per- 
cent, while nominal interest rates on Treas- 
ury securities averaged over 8.0  percent for a 
wide variety of  maturities. All of  this suggests 
that the equilibrium interest rate need not be 
less than the nominal growth rate, let alone 
the CBO assumption, which after tax is 1.5 per- 
centage points lower. 
A smaller growth-ratehnterest-rate  dif- 
ferential would produce a smaller fiscal divi- 
dend. Thus, it is likely to be associated with a 
higher primary deficit relative to output. It 
therefore seems reasonable that consistent 
assumptions would involve both a lower 
growth-rate/interest-rate differential and a 
higher primary deficit. In the context of  table 1, 
the potential bias of  secular elements would 
result in assumptions toward the southeast for 
each time horizon. 
To illustrate, consider a growth-rate/net 
interest-rate differential of 0.5 percent. While 
this scenario implies a pre-tax nominal interest 
rate slightly above the growth rate of  nomi- 
nal GNP, it would still be associated with an 
after-tax interest rate below the growth rate. 
This is not as  favorable as  the CBO assumption 
and is not as likely to be associated with the 
vanishing primary deficit of scenario A. Sup- 
pose that the primary deficit were reduced 
to 1.0 percent of  GNP,  roughly one-third its 
recent level, and half the 2.0 percent of  sce- 
nario B. The associated debt path appears as 
scenario C in figure 8. The debt-to-GNP ratio 
under this alternative would rewind over the 
next 40 years back to a level comparable to 
that during the Korean War. In the longer 
run, the ratio would tend toward the unprec- 
edented steady-state value of  two times GNP, 
five times its current value. 
The relevance of  economic assumptions may 
be demonstrated in another way. How could 
the eventual debt-to-GNP ratio be maintained 
at its current 0.4 value if  the growth-rate/net 
interest-rate differential were the 0.5 value 
assumed in scenario C? The primary deficit 
would have to be 0.2, or the equivalent of  a 
$7.7  billion primary deficit today, roughly 
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Useful projections-those with a semblance 
of  future reality-should not be found to de- 
pend entirely on the precise values of  their 
underlying assumptions. The three scenarios 
described here seem useful in that sense. The 
first, assuming prompt, substantial, and per- 
manent deficit reduction, yields a declining 
debt-to-GNP ratio, with the speed of  the decline 
depending on the size of  the excess of  the eco- 
nomic growth rate over the net interest rate. 
The  second, extrapolating current short-run 
conditions into the long run, and the third, 
using relatively general long-run economic rela- 
tionships and a sizable cut in the primary 
deficit, yield results quite different from the 
first. In either case, the debt-to-GNP ratio will 
slowly grow toward and might eventually 
exceed even the extreme values of  the past. 
The higher the primary deficit and the higher 
the net interest rate relative to the rate of 
economic growth, the sooner those values will 
be realized. 
Fig. 9  Federal Share of  Total Debt 
Percent of  GNP 
- - 
Federal debt  Total debta 
a. Total domestic nonfinancial debt. 
SOURCE: Board of  Governors of  the Federal Reserve System, 
Flow  of Funds. 
Federal Reserve Bank of  Cleveland 
Judging the usefulness of  these projections also 
requires recognition that the assumptions 
might be interdependent. As noted above, less 
favorable economic assumptions might be asso- 
ciated with a higher primary deficit, reflecting 
a smaller fiscal dividend. The resulting debt- 
to-GNP ratio would be even larger than implied 
by the change in economic assumptions alone. 
Or, an assumption of  greater seigniorage in- 
duced by expansionary monetary policy might 
produce more rapid inflation. The increase 
in the growth-rate/net interest-rate differen- 
tial might be offset by a larger primary deficit 
as nominal federal spending grows relative 
to indexed tax receipts. The growth-rate/net 
interest-rate differential also might narrow 
I  as rising inflation expectations raise nominal 
interest rates and, perhaps, lower real eco- 
nomic growth. The  resulting debt-to-GNP ratio 
could be higher than implied by increased seign- 
iorage alone. 
Bearing these possibilities in mind, what 
are the economic consequences of  the various 
scenarios of  the future? Are they consistent 
with widely held beliefs? Failure to follow 
through with the recent budget resolution 
both by actually achieving the entire deficit 
reduction and by extending deficit reduction 
beyond 1988, could mean that by early in the 
next century, the federal debt relative to GNP 
easily could exceed levels reached at the end 
of  World War 11. The  challenge is to imagine 
how that result might be accommodated in an 
economic and social atmosphere less struc- 
tured than the war-based economy of  World 
War 11. 
An important budgetary caveat concerns 
the  ominous debt implications of  this country's 
commitment to Social Security, especially 
if  demographic factors become less favorable. 
Recent 75-year projections published by the 
Social Security Administration indicate that 
while the old age and survivor and disability 
insurance (OASDI) trust funds will continue to 
generate surpluses into the early part of  the 
next century, the rate of  increase of  these sur- 
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pluses relative to GNP will begin to decline 
in the 1990s. Because OASDI Trust Fund sur- 
pluses reduce the borrowing needs of  the Treas- 
ury, the rapid buildup of  these funds over the 
next 10 years is an important force in keeping 
the primary deficit from growing relative to 
GNI?l4 If  deficit reduction measures are not 
sufficient to reduce the primary deficit when 
OASDI funds generate increasing surpluses, 
what will happen to primary deficits and the 
debt when OASDI surpluses begin to decline? 
Another budgetary caveat is that tax re- 
form legislation introduces additional uncer- 
tainties. One has to do with achieving revenue 
neutrality. For example, the administration 
has presented a plan it describes as revenue- 
neutral, but other analyses suggest that the 
plan will actually reduce revenues and thereby 
might widen the deficit. A second uncertainty 
has to do with potential indirect effects of  re- 
form on net interest payments. To the extent 
that average marginal tax rates were to be 
reduced, the momentum of  debt will accelerate 
as the after-tax interest rate rises relative to 
GNP growth. 
Finally, a more fundamental  economic 
caveat is that a rising debt-to-output ratio 
seems inconsistent with the observed con- 
stancy of  the private domestic savings rate 
over the postwar period in the United States. 
This phenomenon, sometimes called Denison's 
Law, is akin to another empirical regularity, 
the relatively stable ratio of  domestic nonfi- 
nancial debt (private and government) to nom- 
inal GNP (see figure 9)j5 An oft-cited implica- 
tion of  this proportionality is that a decrease 
in the growth of  federal debt augments the 
growth of  private (nonfederal) debt relative 
to GNP and might enable more private domes- 
tic investment. Thus, the current concern is 
that federal credit demands could crowd out 
private credit demands and thereby stifle 
the private investment that is necessary to a 
growing economy. 
Secular trends in federal and private debt 
from 1946 through the mid-1970s contrast 
strikingly with their trends over the next 40 
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years according to scenarios B and C. The 
decline in federal debt through 1973 was met 
with a roughly equal rise in nonfederal debt, 
particularly in debt of  households and bus- 
inesses. This decline might have helped ac- 
count for robust postwar growth, particularly 
in the 1960s. 
Projections of  a rising secular trend of  fed- 
eral debt imply that something must give. 
Either the private domestic savings rate must 
rise, breaking Denison's Law in order to sup- 
ply the extra funds required to finance higher 
debt-to-GNP ratios, or the nation must expe- 
rience rising rates of  net foreign investment, 
thus  evading Denison's Law in order to supply 
the extra funds. A third possibility is that 
investment in private capital must decline, 
complying with Denison's Law to offset the 
government demand for extra funds. 
So far in the current economic recovery, Den- 
ison's Law has been evaded. Enlarged private 
and public demands for credit have been met by 
a record inflow of  net foreign capital. This 
is not a cost-free consequence of  a rising debt- 
to-GNP ratio. Growing foreign indebtedness 
requires growing payments out of  GNP to ser- 
vice foreign debt. Capital investment may main- 
tain economic growth, but the fruits of  that 
growth will be enjoyed by the foreign investors 
who made it possible. Moreover, substantial 
adjustment costs must be paid as the capital 
inflow drives up the foreign exchange value of 
the dollar and reduces the competitive posi- 
tion of  trade-related industries. Thus the in- 
ternational adjustments created by the rising 
debt-to-GNP ratio carry significant costs, both 
directly, and (potentially) indirectly through 
inefficiencies associated with protectionist 
measures. 
V  Conclusion 
Prospects for slowing growth of  the national 
debt improved somewhat in August 1985, when 
Congress passed a budget resolution for fis- 
cal year 1986. Although subsequent analysis 
suggests that budget savings would be less 
than purported, the impact on the national debt 
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reductions leading to a balanced budget early 
in the next decade may be viewed as building 
annual legislative roadblocks in the path of 
the growing national debt. Whether such road- 
blocks could be effective can only be known 
when future federal budgets are known. 
Uncertainty about actual federal budgets for 
1986 and beyond is not the only issue troub- 
ling analysts. The reliability of  deficit projec- 
tions based on macroeconomic models and on 
rules of  thumb is always tenuous. Here we 
have provided a secular perspective that dem- 
onstrates that future economic conditions are 
likely to be less favorable for constraining the 
debt-to-GNP ratio than they were for most of 
the postwar period. Whether this change is 
embodied in the models on which deficit and 
debt projections are based, is not clear. 
Cutting the primary deficit remains the 
most certain method of  preventing continuing 
increases in the debt-to-GNP ratio. The chal- 
lenge is to look beyond annual increases to the 
steady advance of  unprecedented peacetime 
levels of  federal debt-and then to take the 
budgetary initiatives required to reverse the 
process. 
still would be significant if  the resolution's 
budget targets were achieved. But budget 
resolutions are only resolutions and are fre- 
quently foresaken, particularly during periods 
of  economic stress. The more recent congres- 
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